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Abstract 
 
This paper proposes to evaluate empirically the consequences of the rent-seeking behavior of 
football clubs on their costs. The empirical work entails estimating a football wage, result, and 
demand system with data on clubs competing in the first and second Spanish leagues over the 
1996-2003 seasons. The estimation sheds light on wage distortions above a theoretical frontier 
that differ from 45% to 52% over the period considered. This provides an interesting illustration 
of the financial difficulties faced recently by many European football clubs. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 The recent theoretical literature on sport economics has proposed to consider sporting contests 
through the window of the tournament and contest theory (Szymanski, 2002). In such framework, 
sport clubs compete for a financial/non-financial prize. To win the prize, they spend costly effort and 
dissipate part of the rent that can be obtained from that prize, damaging thus their own profitability. 
Some features restrain the amount of rent-seeking expenditures, while some others are likely to boost 
it.1 The literature deals mainly with one issue at the time and it is not clear-cut how they interrelate 
(Szymanski and Valletti, 2003). There seems however to be a consensus on the fact that the 
competitive interaction impinging on the activity of the contestants may create a financial distortion on 
their budgets with no relative improvement in performance. Our objective in this paper is to focus on 
clubs competing in the Spanish football industry and provide an empirical evaluation of these rent 
seeking expenditures as well as the financial distortion above a theoretical frontier supported by these 
clubs. Our motivation regarding the choice of the football industry is twofold: 
 First, the football industry is an interesting candidate to consider if one is willing to deal with the 
theory of contests. Football leagues are nation wide contests where several clubs compete against each 
other over a certain period. Clubs spend costly effort to enroll the best players and increase their 
probability to reach a particular result. Since they are production units of different size and they face 
different types of audience, it is well accepted that these clubs have asymmetric valuations of the price 
they run after. Moreover, a football league may offer different prizes, i.e., the best ones compete to 
win the league while others seek the qualification to the European cup or the weakest try to avoid 
relegation to second league (see Rosen and Sanderson, 2001 for more details). Different financial 
stakes that are worth taking into account characterize all these different results. Finally, the recent 
explosion of clubs expenditures following the advent of the pay-TV has certainly an impact on the 
value of the different national leagues. The most profligate leagues will be featuring the highest 
number of international star players and will have the highest value on the international market.  
 Second, experience has shown that the European football industry is going through one of the most 
important crisis of its history. Its clubs are very often forced to reduce their budget significantly, or 
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some of them go bankrupt.2 Examples illustrating this general tendency are numerous: in Spain, clubs 
spent only 92.3 Millions Euros to enroll new players in the national championship in 2002, which 
represents a cut of 211 Millions Euros (358 Millions respectively) with respect to what had been 
invested the year before (two years before respectively). In Italy, three of the most famous clubs of the 
championship faced important financial difficulties. Two of them, Roma and Lazio, found it difficult 
to reduce their deficit and to meet the requirements to be allowed to register in the championship, 
while a third one, Fiorentina, went bankrupt. In addition, several players of the other teams accepted to 
reduce their earnings and some club directors advocated some corrective measures.3 In England, 
several clubs competing in the second league went close to bankruptcy (Bradford and Leicester among 
others). In Germany in 2002, the clubs invested 102.2 Millions Euros in hiring, which represents a 
35% cut with respect to the previous year. The total amount of debt in 2003 in the Spanish and Italian 
Leagues amounts to 1.625 and 1.800 Billions Euros, respectively.4 We argue that these financial 
difficulties are the direct consequence of the competitive interaction between clubs. 
 Our intention is to assess empirically how the amount of rent-seeking expenditure supported by 
clubs depends on several relevant features that characterized the football industry. To do so, we 
consider a simultaneous system of three wage - result - demand equations. Such a procedure allows 
accounting for the constraints impinging on the activity of each club. We choose moreover to 
approach the definition of the wage equation through the window of the stochastic frontiers literature.5 
This implies considering a football club as a production unit involved in a production process whose 
ingredients such as the production itself and the inputs have to be identified. This is an interesting task 
in the particular context of the sport industry. Once the production process is identified, a wage 
frontier defining a relationship between a production level and the minimal average wage that allows 
the producer to reach the required production level can be determined.6 The frontier thus provides us 
with a one to one relationship between, on one hand, a specific result made by a club under certain 
conditions, and a theoretical average wage on the other hand. Considering all the production units 
competing inside a specific league allows us to identify this frontier. We argue then that the distance 
between such frontier and the individual and observable average wage of a club provides a direct 
measure of the amount of expenditures of this club that produces no relative gain in performance, but 
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is supported at the equilibrium. We call such expenditure the individual wage distortion above the 
industry’s frontier. In the context of the football industry, estimating an average wage frontier entails 
disentangling the minimum average wage that allows the football clubs to reach their production levels 
relative to the other competitor in the industry (i.e., their relative performances), from the part of the 
average wage due to the rent-seeking behavior of clubs in the vain attempt to enhance their relative 
position in the competition. This paper proposes an empirical evaluation of the industry’s global 
distortion as well as individual assessments for each club. 
 A possible drawback of this study is the highly aggregated nature of the data available. This is 
particularly true for financial data. The sources of revenue of a football club, as well as the different 
parts constituting its global budget are difficult to observe. Note for instance that we use a measure of 
club average wage that aggregates the wages of the players of the same team, as well as the wages of 
players and non-players inside a team. On one hand, vertical wage aggregation inside the club should 
be a minor problem since non-players represent a small share of the total wage bill (less than 5% over 
the period observed. Source: Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional). On the other hand, some clubs may 
be characterized by a highly heterogeneous wage distribution across players. Working at a more 
aggregate level constraints the structure of the economic model under consideration and reduces the 
information that could be obtained from it. However, considering a simultaneous system of wage, 
performance, and demand might be helpful in order to treat part of the endogeneity that affects the 
variables under the control of each production unit. This is the methodology that we consider here. 
 The Spanish industry serves as a support for our study. Its organization as well as the behavior of 
its clubs has been particularly appealing over the last decade, as argued in detail in what follows. The 
database includes observations for the forty clubs playing in first and second league over the period 
1996-2002. The next section presents the model to be estimated. Section 3 describes the Spanish 
football industry in more details. Section 4 presents the data as well as the estimation procedure and 
the results. Section 5 proposes a discussion and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
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 Our aim in this section is to construct a football wage, result, and demand system that can be 
applied to the Spanish industry. The estimation of the model will allow us to explore the structure of 
the industry and provide an individual measure of the rent-seeking distortion that affects the average 
wage of each club participating to the contest. 
 
Production and Costs 
 Each football club is a production unit. The club produces a result Y during the season. We need 
first to define the inputs that enter the production process. It is assumed that the result Y depends on 
the average quality of each player. Following Hoen and Szymanski (1999) and Szymanski (2000), we 
suppose that the average quality and the average cost of the player are closely related.7 Considering 
that the cost of labor w* instead of the usual quantity of labor L enters the production function is fair in 
the particular context of the football industry. The usual studies on production consider that firms are 
price takers and control for the quantity of labor in order to attain a particular production level. Such 
an approach does not fit the football industry. First, the firms may have sufficient power to affect the 
costs proposed at the equilibrium on the labor market. Second, given that the amount of players on the 
playground is restricted, it is well admitted that a higher number of players does not allow the teams to 
obtain better result. We therefore assume that what matters is the quality of the group of players and 
not its size. Beside the costs, the experience K may be another good candidate to help producing a 
result. It is supposed to be fixed in the short run. The experience for each club will be measured by the 
number of years spent in first league and the number of years spent in second league. Note that a club 
with a long history in the first league is expected to have higher valuations of the prize it is competing 
for. 
 We also introduce a third term, namely ε , to account for the unpredictable events, that are beyond 
the control of the club, and that might affect its result. Let X be a vector of additional explanatory 
variables that will be emphasized at the moment of the estimation. We define then the production 
function of each unit as the following: 
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( )βε,,,,* tXKwfY = , (1) 
 
where β  is a vector of parameters describing the technology and t is a trend. 
From equation (1), we know that, to obtain the result Y, the manager must pay the relevant average 
cost (that is, buy the relevant average quality) 
 
 ( )βε,,,,1* tXKYfw −= . (2) 
 
 We argue that an unobservable individual distortion θ  affects the primal average cost w* of 
each club. This distortion results from the competitive interaction between clubs, which is taken as 
exogenous here; it does not improve their relative performance, but instead entails an upward cost 
distortion. As this term is unobservable, it needs to be evaluated through the estimation process. 
Hence, the observed average wage w is 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )θβεθ exp,,,,exp 1* tXKYfww −== . (3) 
 
Note that the introduction of a trend t allows us to shed light on the propensity of the football 
technology to be more costly over the years. We expect t to have a positive effect on the clubs’ 
average wage w. The average wage equation given in (3) is a stochastic frontier that needs to be 
estimated.  
 The result Y obtained by the club may itself depend on factors such as the characteristics of this 
club and the environment where the production process takes place, i.e., Y may itself be endogenous. 
For instance, clubs performing better may be the ones with a higher share of foreign players, with a 
higher share of members of the national team, those with a new coach, or those facing a higher 
demand. All these variables may also affect the average wage and therefore need to be accounted for 
in separate equations. It is therefore proposed to estimate a result and a demand equation jointly with 
the wage equation. 
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Result and demand 
 The relation between result Y and demand D in the football industry depends upon two effects that 
need to be considered.  
 On one hand, demand depends on the result of the team (see Szymanski and Smith, 1997, Hoen and 
Szymanski, 1999, and Dobson and Goddard, 2001). We expect the audience to be attracted by teams 
that are performing better during the season. Whether the players are foreigners or not, whether they 
play in national teams, the arrival of a new trainer, the number of the titles won by the club in the past 
are also features that are worth taking into account. It is important as well to consider the 
attractiveness of the team, which implies taking into account the fact that the team presents an 
offensive or defensive configuration. This effect can be captured through several variables like for 
instance the position of the players on the field or the number of goals scored. Finally, we expect the 
size of the “potential market” faced by each club to be another important ingredient to determine 
demand.  
 Note that our demand expression does not include a price variable. This is due to the absence of 
systematic information on prices for clubs in our database. We can only observe upper and lower 
bonds of seasonal tickets prices for first division only, and from 2000 to 2003 (our database includes 
clubs competing in first and second division form 1996 to 2003). Since data are scarce, and since 
prices are certainly endogenous, i.e., they may depend on the rent seeking activity of clubs, we remove 
the price variable from the demand equation. Note that this should not affect the estimation 
significantly since most empirical studies in football fail to find a significant relationship between 
prices and attendance, especially in samples with a short time dimension.8 The demand function is of 
the form 
 
 
( )γη,,,,, tSZAYDD = , (4) 
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where A and Z denote attractiveness and characteristics of the team, S is the size of the market, η is an 
error term and γ is a vector of parameters. We also introduce a trend whose effect on demand is 
expected to be positive, i.e., demand should be increasing from one year to the other. Increasing 
broadcasting of football matches has completely changed the size and composition of demand and 
revenues for football clubs. Starting mainly in the 80s, the impact of television broadcasting has 
accelerated in the 90s especially thanks to the advent of the pay-per-view televisions. The pay-per-
view system has determined a dramatic increase in market size for a single match. 
 On the other hand, the result Y must be adjusted to the level of demand D, so the former is 
endogenous to the latter. We therefore assume that the result of a team is constrained by the size of its 
audience. The main motivation for such an assumption is that a larger audience generates larger 
revenues and more ambitious results. Here we simply introduce a reduced form of a dynamic and 
technical adjustment process between result Y and demand D that we specify as follows: 
 
 
( )δρφ ,DY = , (5) 
 
where ρ is an error term and δ is a vector of parameters. 
 Note that the demand function in equation (4) is interpreted as a short-run demand since it takes the 
result Y as given. By replacing Y in this demand function by its expression in equation (5), we obtain a 
reduced form interpreted as the long run demand function, defined as 
 
 
( )dtSZAD ξϕ ,,,,= , (6) 
 
where ξ is an error term, which depends on ρ and η, and d is the final vector of parameters to be 
estimated. Estimating equations (5) and (6) avoids the simultaneity problem that exists between D and 
Y. 
 We do not consider the effect of the uncertainty of outcome on demand. Several authors including 
Neale (1964) have noted the connection between uncertainty of outcome in sporting contests with their 
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popularity. It is usually considered that uncertainty of outcome is due to a close championship race 
with several teams in contention or the absence of long run domination by a particular team. The main 
reason why uncertainty of outcome is discarded in this analysis is that the Spanish championship is 
probably the most unbalanced one of all major European Leagues. Between 1946 and 1999, Barcelona 
and Real Madrid won 39 titles out of 54. Moreover, from 1946 onwards, only 15 teams finished in the 
top three places and this is the smallest number among the major European football leagues. Over our 
period of observation, i.e., between 1996 and 2003, Real Madrid and Barcelona were ranked in the top 
two places 57% of the time. Moreover, over the same period, there was an average six points 
difference between the team ranked first and the one ranked second. 
 The next step consists in estimating equations (3), (5) and (6). Note that the whole model under 
consideration is sequential. Since the system gives rise to a block-recursive structure, each equation 
can be estimated separately. We turn now to the description of the Spanish industry and the data 
available. 
 
3. The Spanish industry 
 
 The Spanish Professional league is a natural candidate for our purpose. Note first that the Spanish 
clubs have been among the most profligate ones regarding expenditures on wages and compensation 
fees. Table 1 shows two rankings of the highest wages given in Europe in 1999 and of the biggest 
compensation fees that have been paid ever. 
 Second, Spanish clubs are not present on the stock market yet, contrary to English clubs for 
instance, and this might have a significant impact on clubs policies. Apart from being a source of 
finance, the stock market also acts as a constraint on expenditures and losses, because clubs are 
responsible towards their shareholders. In Spain, an assembly composed of fellows supporting the 
team generally elects the president of the club. As the fellows care about sportive results rather than 
profits, it seems that non-pecuniary results are particularly important in the valuation of the prizes for 
Spanish clubs, exacerbating the rent seeking. Indeed, clubs presidents are pressed to raise expenditures 
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levels in order to enroll the best players. This specific context is therefore particularly appropriated for 
our study. 
 Another interesting characteristic of the Spanish industry may lie in the fact that the ethnical and 
cultural pride of some of its clubs strengthens competitive and even aggressive behaviors on the labor 
demand side. The performance of the team assumes therefore a peculiar importance, as a matter of 
nationalistic pride, adding up to increase the valuation of the rent and the associated rent-seeking 
expenditure level. 
 Finally, the Spanish professional league seems to have fully accomplished the Bosman revolution 
since it is one of the most internationally open of the European Leagues: in 1999 only 61% of players 
were Spanish nationals. As a result, some of the best European and non-European players are 
participating to the Spanish competition which might be the strongest one in Europe. 
 
4. Estimation and results 
 
 We present in this section the estimation of the system defined above and the estimation results. 
The variables entering the equations are first examined in more detail. 
 
The system 
The demand function is specified as 
 
 ln D = d0 + d1 SYS + d2 ln GOAL + d3 SFOR + 
  + d4 SFORW + d5 SNAT + d6 TRAIN + d7 ln POP + d8 t + ξ (7) 
 
As said above, the variables to be considered in the demand function should be the size of the market, 
the attractiveness and the characteristics of the team.  
 The strategic scheme elected (SYS) and the number of goals scored during the season (GOAL) are 
used as proxies in order to evaluate the attractiveness of the team. There are mainly two types of 
strategic schemes implemented by teams: three forwards and three midfielders or two forwards and 
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four midfielders. The variable SYS takes value one if the former strategy is implemented, and zero 
otherwise. We expect a more offensive strategy (i.e., with three forwards) to attract a larger audience. 
Likewise, we expect the numbers of goals scored to have a positive effect on demand.  
 There are several variables that can be viewed as good candidates to describe the characteristics of 
the team. First, foreign players playing outside their own country are typically highly skilled and have 
a significant influence on the performance of the team. Thus, we include two variables in (7) to 
consider the effects of foreign players on demand: SFOR is the share of foreign players and SFORW is 
the share of foreign players from outside Europe among the foreign players. These two variables 
should have a positive effect on demand. Second, Spanish players who are also members of the 
national team are also expected to have an ability that is higher than the average. Therefore, the share 
of such players (SNAT) is also accounted for. We anticipate demand to be also positively influenced in 
this case. Third, we introduce a dummy variable (TRAIN) that takes value one if the trainer of the team 
is new, and zero otherwise. The manager is responsible for the training and the organization of the 
team. The presidents of the clubs decide on changing trainers when new (higher) results are in order. 
The audience is usually highly sensitive to such a decision and TRAIN should have a positive effect on 
demand. 
 The last explanatory variable is POP. It denotes the size of the population of the city to which the 
club under consideration belongs. Obviously, teams representing large urban areas attract a larger 
audience. This variable acts as a proxy for the market size and thus we expect it to have a positive 
effect on demand. 
 The characterization of the endogenous variable D is now required. The audience is roughly 
defined as the set of individuals supporting the team. It includes spectators attending the games in the 
stadium, those watching the games on television, but also people generally following the performance 
of the club through the media. To evaluate and measure the size of such an audience is a difficult task. 
However, a very useful proxy can be considered for that matter. We use the average effective 
attendance during the season as a proxy for general audience. Note that this allows us to take into 
account two individual effects. The first effect, denoted as the size effect, implies that a more popular 
team plays in a bigger stadium, which is consistent with a larger audience; it can be seen as a long-run 
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effect. The second effect, denoted as the liking effect, is a short-run effect. It implies that the 
instantaneous attendance of the stadium gets close to full capacity when the team is performing well, 
which should be a clear indicator of how the general audience behaves along the season. Taken 
together, these two effects should be helpful for our purpose. 
 We turn now to the result equation. It is simply determined as 
 
 ρδδ ++= DY ˆlnln 10 . (8) 
 
Note that Dˆ  is the predicted value of D obtained from the estimation of equation (7). We need to 
define a measure of the variable Y. The result of the club is measured by an index of actual 
performance of this club along the season. A simple and fair instrument is the number of points 
obtained by each team at the end of the season. Any victory is worth three points while a draw yields 
one point. All first league teams are credited a surplus of points equal to the total amount obtained by 
the best team of the second league at the end of the season. Doing so enables us to consider the forty 
teams simultaneously, as if they all belonged to one single league. 
 The last equation to be estimated is the average wage function. It is defined as 
 
 ln w = β0 + β1 ln Ŷ + β2 DIV+ β3 ln UEFA + β4 ln K1 + 
  + β5 ln K2 + β6 ln CAPS + β7 t +θ + ε (9) 
 
The average wage is measured by the annual total budget divided by the number of players. Note that 
total budget includes the total wage bill as well as depreciated fee expenditures that must be paid in 
order to purchase players from other clubs.  
 Several explanatory variables are required to identify individual distortions above the wage frontier 
from the effects that are responsible for rent-seeking expenditures and are common to the whole 
industry. The right side of Equation (9) includes the number of players L, the result Y, and the 
experience K. Note that we use the predicted result Yˆ  obtained from the estimation of equation (8). 
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The experience K is decomposed into two variables. The first one, 1K , denotes the number of years 
spent in first league while 2K  indicates the number of years spent in second league. We expect these 
two variables to have opposite effects on clubs expenditures. Indeed, the valuation of the prize by 
teams’ presidents, and thus, their behavior regarding expenditures should depend on the history of the 
performance of the club since its creation. For instance, a club with a long history in the first league is 
expected to have higher valuations, thus, higher long run results and larger wages. Likewise, a club, 
which spent most of his history in second league, may not be able and/or willing to afford high 
expenses.  
 Besides result and experience, we introduce additional variables in order to capture part of the 
heterogeneity among production units. The first one (UEFA) is a dummy variable that takes value one 
if the team simultaneously competes in the European league, and zero otherwise. This variable should 
have a positive influence on wages since being committed on two fronts needs additional units of 
talents. Another variable of interest is CAPS, which measures the number of times the players of the 
team have been enrolled in their respective national squad. This variable enables us to control for the 
quality of the players enrolled in the team and it should also have a positive effect on wages. Besides, 
we use a dummy variable (DIV) that takes value one if the team is competing in first division, and zero 
otherwise. This variable should most certainly have a positive effect on wages. Finally a trend t is 
introduced. 
 
Data 
In order to test the economic model, we need data on the financial performance of the clubs as well as 
data on the supply and demand of the industry. The database is constructed using the annual data 
collection edited by the Spanish sport newspaper Marca. The collection dates back to the beginning of 
the nineties but relevant information regarding clubs competing in the Second league could only been 
obtained from 1996. Therefore, our sample includes information on all clubs of First and Second 
league starting with the 1996-1997 season up to the 2002-2003 season, which represents seven years 
of observation. Marca is a rich source of data regarding clubs budgets as well as players and teams 
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characteristics and performances, stadiums affluences, clubs’ historical course etc. The First league 
embraces twenty clubs while the Second League may include twenty or twenty-two clubs. At the end 
of each season, the three clubs ranked at the bottom of First League go down to Second League. 
Likewise, the four worst clubs of Second League are relegated to Third League and the three best 
clubs are promoted to First League.  
Note that two samples will be considered: The first one is an unbalanced panel, which includes 281 
observations. Some clubs may disappear from one year to the other, i.e., may go down to Third 
League and hence may disappear from the sample while new ones may appear since some Third 
League clubs are promoted and ascend to Second League. The result is a database of fifty different 
clubs that are not necessarily observed seven times over the period. The second sample that will be 
considered is a balanced panel. Considering simultaneously a balanced panel allows us to drop all the 
clubs that compete in Third League at least once during the period of observation and thus reduce the 
heterogeneity among the economic agents. The balanced panel includes observations on 28 clubs 
observed seven times over the period. In order to complete the database, the data on urban areas’ 
population (variable POP in equation 7) has been collected from the website of the Instituto Nacional 
de Estatisticas (INE).9 
Summary statistics regarding the variables are provided in Table 2. 
 
Estimation 
 The system to be estimated is made of equations (7), (8) and (9). Since it is sequential, the three 
expressions can be estimated separately. The three error terms ξ, ρ and ε are supposed to be 
independent and to have a normal density function (with mean 0 and respective variances 2ξσ , 2ρσ  and 
2
εσ .) Maximum likelihood applied to equations (7) and (8) does not require additional specifications. 
However, when estimating the cost function expressed in (9), a difficulty arises due to the fact that the 
term θ  is unobservable. We will assume that θ  is characterized by a density function )(θf  defined 
over an interval [0, ∞). 
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 The error structure εθ +=u  adopted in (9) follows a Panel Data specification where ε  are 
assumed to be i.i.d. ( )2,0 εσN  and θ  is a non-negative term accounting for distortions above the 
theoretical frontier.10 
 We need now to say something about the density )(θf  and the way the estimation is performed. 
Denoting as Tt ,...,1=  and Ni ,...,1= , the subscripts for time and clubs respectively, five different 
procedures of estimation are considered:  
(i) The first procedure considers that the θ s are constant over time but vary across clubs. Moreover, 
the density )(θf  is half normal, i.e., the iθ  are i.i.d ( )2,0 θσ+N . 
(ii) The second procedure is similar to the previous one except that the density )(θf  is Truncated 
normal, i.e., the iθ  are i.i.d ( )2, θσµ+N . This allows the distribution to have a nonzero mode and 
provides a somewhat more flexible representation of the pattern of the distortion θ  in the data. Note 
that an additional parameter µ  needs then to be estimated.  
(iii) The third procedure assumes that the θ s differ from one club to the other and vary systematically 
with time. They are of the form ( )( )Ttiit −−= ηθθ exp  and are assumed to be i.i.d as truncations at 0 
of the ( )2,0 θσ+N  distribution. Note that this specification requires an additional parameter η , identical 
for all clubs, to be estimated.  
(iv) The next procedure is similar to the previous one except that the density )(θf  is Truncated 
normal, i.e., the iθ  are i.i.d ( )2, θσµ+N . 
(v) Note that the four previous specifications require the itε  and the iθ  to be distributed independently 
of each other, and of the regressors. Moreover, specific distributional forms are necessary for θ . 
These two constraints can be relaxed if the iθ  are considered as fixed effects. This procedure can be 
performed through the estimation of a different constant i0β  for each club. This approach is 
interesting in the sense that the assumption that the distortion iθ  may not be independent from the 
result Y should not be discarded. Moreover, this is an additional mean to provide more evidence on the 
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robustness of the results since the chosen distributional form for θ  may influence the individual 
estimates iθˆ . 
 The results of the different estimations are presented below. Three types of comments are worth 
emphasizing. First, since two databases are considered, we specify ten different sets of results for the 
estimation of the wage function.11 Our aim is to show that the estimation results regarding the 
distortions θ s are robust to the nature of the dataset and the type of estimation considered.  
 Second, note that with panel data, the estimator is able to distinguish each club’s individual 
persistence from statistical noise. Therefore, the realization of iθ  for a particular firm can be 
identified, thus overcoming the limitation of a cross-section from which one can only identify the 
expectation of iθ  conditional on statistical noise (see Sickles, 2003 for a discussion of this issue).  
 Finally, note that the identification of the theoretical frontier ( )βε,,,,1* tXKYfw −=  requires 
observing some clubs that are not affected by rent dissipation. Hence, absolute rent dissipation values 
are obtained instead of relative values. We believe that accounting for second division clubs is helpful 
on that matter. Moreover, among the clubs competing in the first League are the ones from the Basque 
country (one of the Spanish provinces). These clubs have the particularity of mostly enrolling Basque 
players, the most extreme case being Athletic Club from Bilbao hiring only players from its own 
province. We are confident that, in this latter case, rent dissipation activity is almost nil, as will be 
confirmed in the results presented in the next section. 
 
Results 
 The results are reproduced in Tables 3 and 4. We present first the ones on the demand and result 
equations.  
 Consider the result equation. The R-squared is equal to 0.559 (0.549 respectively) if the unbalanced 
panel (balanced respectively) is taken into consideration. All the parameters are strongly significant. 
The result suggests that performance is affected by the size of the audience. Moreover, the nature of 
the dataset considered does not affect the demand elasticity of performance in a significant manner.  
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 Consider now the demand equation. The R-squared (0.940 if the panel is unbalanced and 0.878 if 
the panel is balanced) suggests that the variables selected strongly explain the size of the audience. A 
first set of results goes along with the initial intuition. Thus, demand significantly increases with the 
number of goals scored (GOAL).12 Moreover, it is positively affected if the club strategy responds to a 
more offensive profile (SYS takes value one).13 This suggests that the audience increases if the team 
considered presents a higher offensive profile. 
 Unsurprisingly, the characteristics of the squad enrolled in the club are essential to explain demand. 
The audience responds positively and significantly to a higher share of players with experience in the 
national team of their country of origin (SNAT). This latter variable is a good candidate to account for 
quality in the team. A striking result also comes from the variables related to the national identity of 
players. The estimation sheds light on the fact that the share of players (SFOR) from outside Spain 
sways negatively demand. It should be noted however that the parameter for SFOR is only significant 
at 10% in the balanced panel, while it is not significant in the unbalanced one. Moreover, if the share 
of players from outside Europe among foreign players (SFORW) is higher, then demand is positively 
and significantly affected. These two results may suggest the following: First, the audience may have a 
preference for Spanish players. Second, most non-European players of the Spanish league come from 
South America, and, in the view of the audience, such players may be culturally similar to Spanish 
players and may not alter the national identity of the club. Another possible explanation relies on the 
supposed comparative advantage of the different types of players. Again, in the view of the audience, 
South American players convey the idea of an entertaining and attractive way of playing, which is not 
necessarily associated with continental European players. 
 The population size of the city (POP) from which the club originates has a positive and significant 
effect on demand. Likewise, demand increases over time, as indicated by the positive parameter of the 
trend t. Finally, note that the coefficient of TRAIN is not significant in any of the estimations. Contrary 
to what has been predicted, the latter suggests that our databases do not provide any empirical 
evidence regarding the way demand is affected by the hiring of a new trainer. 
 We focus now on the wage expression. Table 4 presents six different sets of results where the 
following distinctions are made: (1) The panel is unbalanced, the θ s are constant over time but vary 
 19
across clubs, and the density )(θf  is half normal. (2) The panel is unbalanced, the θ s differ from one 
club to the other and vary systematically with time, and the density )(θf  is half normal. (3) The panel 
is unbalanced and the θ s are treated as fixed effects. (4) The panel is balanced, the θ s are constant 
over time but vary across clubs, and the density )(θf  is half normal. (5) The panel is balanced, the θ s 
differ from one club to the other and vary systematically with time, and the density )(θf  is half 
normal. (6) The panel is balanced and the θ s are treated as fixed effects. In the course of the 
estimation it appeared that the parameter µ  was never statistically different from 0. We therefore 
discarded the truncated normal distributions and rather focus on half normal ones.  
 We observe only small deviations of the parameters values across the different sets of results. As 
expected, the coefficient of Yˆ  is always positive and significant, which implies that a higher 
performance requires a greater wage. Note that a 1% increase in performance requires a less than 1% 
increase in wages, meaning that the industry is characterized by economies of scale. The parameters of 
1K  and 2K  are always positive and negative, respectively, and significant. This confirms that the 
history of the club performance matters when defining the wage. As explained previously, the director 
of the production process is more inclined to set up a large average wage if the club performed well in 
the past. On the other hand, weak performances in the past act as a break upon results. The parameters 
of UEFA are all positive and significant. This suggests that the average wage is higher if the club is 
involved simultaneously in the European championship. Surprisingly, the coefficient of CAPS turned 
out to be non-significant and failed to act as a variable that accounts for quality in the team. Note 
however that the coefficients of CAPS are positive as expected. The variable DIV that takes value 1 if 
the club competes in First League and 0 otherwise presents a positive and significant parameter in all 
the models. This entails that the average wage is higher when the clubs compete in first division. Note 
also that the parameter of the trend t is positive implying that the average wage of the whole industry 
is increasing over time.  
 Finally, the parameter η  is negative and significant. This is an interesting result, which shows that 
the clubs’ wage distortions over the theoretical frontier follow a systematic and significant increase 
over time. This suggests that the overall value of the Spanish football league as well as the valuation of 
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the prizes by clubs have increased, as indicated by the theory. The average increase from one year to 
the other is estimated to be close to 6%, regardless of which database is considered. A simple 
likelihood ratio test allows testing model (2) against model (1) and model (5) against model (4). The 
LR test statistic is equal to 4 (3.2 respectively) if the panel is unbalanced (balanced respectively), 
which confirms that the model that allows θ  to increase over time is preferred to a model where θ  
remains constant over time.14 
 
5. Evaluating individual wage distortions 
 
 From the estimation of the three equations system, predictions of individual wage distortion 
parameters θ  can be recovered using the procedures initiated by Hausman and Taylor (1981) and 
Battese and Coelli (1988). The wage distortion over the theoretical frontier is simply defined as 
( )θexp . 
 Table 5 provides estimates of the individual ( )iθexp . Five sets of results are presented; they are 
associated to the models (1)-(5) defined above. Note that specification (6) has been discarded since the 
constant and the output parameter are not significant and this may alter the validity of our estimates.15 
 Several results are worth emphasizing. First, note that the estimation results are usually robust to 
the nature of the estimation procedure or the dataset under consideration. They show little differences 
with respect to the ranking of the clubs and the evaluation of their individual distortion. Second, 10 to 
16% of clubs in the unbalanced sample (18% to 21.4% in the balanced one) have a distortion greater 
than 2, i.e., their observed average wage is more than twice higher than the theoretical wage predicted 
by their performance. This suggests a strong discrepancy between a few firms that can support heavy 
distortions of their expenses and the others that suffer from higher financial constraints. 
Unsurprisingly, the most famous clubs in the history of the Spanish league belong to this first group 
with the highest distortion, signaling a more active rent-seeking activity. Third, notice that First 
League and Second League clubs can be indifferently found along the different positions of the five 
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different ranking, suggesting that there is no clear persistence in the relationship between each league 
and the wage distortions of the clubs.  
 Finally, consider the unbalanced panel.16 The means for the average club of the sample range from 
1.452 to 1.525, i.e., the distortion of the average firm lies from 45.2 to 52.5% above the frontier. The 
average club supports a budget of 19.8 millions Euros over the period.17 This implies that such a club 
bears an absolute distortion of 6.1 to 6.8 millions Euros above the theoretical frontier. Note that this 
club would have reached the same performance if no distortion had been dissipated, i.e., with a budget 
that ranges from 13 to 13.7 millions Euros. A similar remark can be provided for the whole Spanish 
football industry. Consider for instance the last year of observation, i.e., the 2002-2003 season. The 
whole industry supported during this period a total budget of 1.182 Billion Euros, while the total 
distortion above the theoretical frontier ranged from 368 to 407 millions Euros, depending on whether 
estimation procedures (1), (2) or (3) are considered. Again, all the clubs of both First and Second 
League would have reached the same performance if these distortions had not been dissipated.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 Considering simultaneously the demand, the result, and the average wage of football clubs 
performing in the Spanish league has allowed us to obtain interesting results regarding the structure of 
the industry and the financial results of these clubs.  
 First, the parameters of the variables of interest are usually significant and have the expected signs; 
individual estimates of wage distortions go well with basic intuitions. This suggests that the 
methodology chosen in this paper presents some empirical relevance. 
 Second, the empirical results have shed light on important wages and budget distortions faced by 
clubs competing in the industry for the different prizes. The estimated budget distortion in nominal 
terms during the 2002-2003 season amounts to a stunning figure of 368 to 407 millions Euros. It 
seems that rent-dissipation is particularly high for the Spanish football industry, in accordance with 
casual observation of losses and debts of football teams. 
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 The results in this paper illustrate well the importance of the financial difficulty faced by many 
clubs in the Spanish industry and other European countries at the end of 2003. A recent special issue 
of the Journal of Sport Economics (volume 7, number 1) on a potential financial crisis in the European 
football industry sheds light on this issue. In particular, it seems to be well admitted that many clubs in 
Europe are facing an imbalance between incomes and expenditures, as well as a rising debt. This is 
particularly true for small and large clubs in Italy, and small clubs in England, Scotland, Belgium, and 
Portugal. Note that observing small clubs facing financial deficits goes in line with our result that 
wage distortion affects clubs from any division or any position in the final ranking of the 
championship. Paradoxically, the main cause of the financial crisis in these clubs has been the 
increasing amount of income entering the game, from television and other sources. 
 There may be several solutions to such crisis: First, following the tight regulation that has been 
practiced in France, the Union of European Football Associations could for instance require from 
clubs annual audited financial statements, or proofs that clubs have no overdue payments for transfer 
activities or no payment owning to employees. The Union could condition the participation of clubs to 
European competitions on the respect of these criteria. A second possible solution is to adopt 
American practices: American major leagues such as basketball, baseball or American football are 
usually financially stable organizations. They implement several regulatory mechanisms such as salary 
caps, draft rules, or revenue sharing and redistribution rules. Redistribution rules is maybe the most 
appealing scheme but is currently difficult to put into practice in Europe since clubs are facing the 
punishment of being relegated to a lower division. Hence, the European football industry may have to 
restructure its competition framework and may impose greater restrictions on the mobility of clubs 
between upper and lower divisions. 
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Notes 
 
1. In the symmetric setting of Tullock (1980), the individual effort (or rent-seeking expenditure) 
increases with the value of the prize, and decreases with the number of contestants. It is suggested that 
players are caught in a prisoner dilemma type of equilibrium, i.e., the probability of winning is the 
same for each player and is therefore independent from the level of effort provided at the equilibrium. 
From the point of view of the contestants, the least costly situation to be obtained is then the one were 
they are able to coordinate on a symmetric equilibrium with the lowest possible level of effort. Such 
equilibrium is not feasible since the strategic interaction among the players leads to a higher level of 
expenditure with no relative gain in performance. This model has then been extended in various ways. 
It has been suggested for instance that teams may have different valuations of the prize (Hillman and 
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Riley, 1989; Nti, 1999; and Stein, 2002). Asymmetric valuations tend to generate a bias towards 
under-dissipation of the rent, making the total rent dissipation smaller than what could be obtained in a 
symmetric context. Likewise, competitors may be offered several prices simultaneously. Clark and 
Riis (1996 and 1998) show that in a multiple prize and symmetric players setting, the amount of rent 
seeking is reduced compared to a situation where there is a unique price. Finally, the value of the prize 
clubs are competing for may itself be endogenous. Chung (1996) for instance proposes a framework 
where the value of the prize increases with the effort spent by all the participants. 
Contexts as different as economic organizations, wars competition for natural monopoly, patent races, 
political rent seeking, and sport competitions can be described as contests where players spend 
resources to win a price. Rent seeking with asymmetric valuations of the price is probably the most 
common situation encountered in practice. Political candidates competing to win an election or 
employees struggling for a job promotion are potential examples. Each competitor may have a private 
valuation of the price, which may depend on his/her own characteristics and/or experience. This 
feature is also the most common in sport competition: A club/player that has just been promoted to 
first division may have a different valuation of a top position in the ranking than an experienced club, 
which has been competing for years to obtain it. Likewise, sport disciplines, such as basketball or 
football, which imply promotion, relegation, or qualification for a European competition, are all 
examples of simultaneous contests where competitors may be offered several prices simultaneously 
(win the championship, avoid relegation, qualify for the European cup for instance). In multi-stage 
contests, such as tennis championship, players usually compete for a single price, i.e., the final victory 
in the tournament. Finally, R&D investment to obtain a monopoly right is an example of a case where 
the value of the prize firms are competing for is endogenous: In this case, the monopoly’s profit 
increases with total investments. We are not aware of such endogenous prize framework in a sport 
competition environment. 
2. Experts usually argue that there are two main reasons for such a decline. First, television channels, 
which have constituted the main source of clubs’ revenues over the last ten years, are facing financial 
difficulties, or decide to reduce significantly their expenditures on football broadcasting. This is the 
case of Via Digital or Canal Plus in Spain, RAI in Italy, ITV Digital in England, and Kirch in 
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Germany. Second, the introduction of the Bosman law in 1995 dramatically changed the European 
football labor market regulations. Before 1995, any club willing to hire a player had to pay a 
compensation fee to the former club even if the contract had expired. Hence, even out-of-contract 
players were not completely free to leave their employer. Moreover, the clubs were not allowed to 
employ more than three players coming from abroad. The clubs had strong bargaining power since 
they could prevent a player from changing team if the compensation fee did not satisfy them. The 
situation was very much alike the case of clubs’ monopsony power described by Rottenberg (1956) in 
the baseball industry. Since 1995, an out-of-contract player can freely negotiate with a team and does 
not have to pay any compensation fee to his former club. The clubs now anticipate this new ingredient 
and provide the players with incentives to sign long-term contracts. The main consequence has been 
that the compensation fees and players’ wages have greatly increased since 1995.  
Taken together, these two effects had important consequences on clubs’ liability. Since clubs are 
loosing their most lucrative source of revenue, they are not capable of handling the explosion of their 
budgets and the growing increase of players’ wages. 
3. See for instance the interview of Galliani (vice president of A.C. Milan and president of the Italian 
Football League) who advocates salary caps in the Corriere della Sera, 18th of May 2002. Moreover, 
on 5th November 2002, the so-called G-14, a group of western Europe’s biggest clubs, met in Brussels 
to draw up new rules and proposed that from 2005 its members restrict their salary bills to 70% of the 
club’s turnover. 
4. These data have been collected in El País, 28th of August 2002, L’Equipe, 23rd of October 2002 and 
Repubblica 8th of June 2003. 
5. The stochastic frontier analysis is frequently used in sport economics, see for instance Hofler and 
Payne (1996 and 1997), or the chapter 5 in Dobson and Goddard (2000) for a survey. Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) may be another potential technique although it is less often employed in 
sport economics. Note that it is usually considered that the stochastic approach is more applicable in 
situations where measurement errors and random effects influence the data, as it is the case in our 
study. Although some recent developments in stochastic DEA have attempted to address the issue of 
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DEA being non-stochastic, we choose in this paper a broadly parametric approach for ease of 
exposition, given that we use a three equations structure. 
6. It is usually suggested that European football clubs depart from sport professional clubs in the U.S. 
in the sense that they care more about their ranking in the national championship than their profit. 
Professional teams in the U.S. are usually thought as profit maximizers, while European clubs may 
only be performance seekers in sport competition. This idea goes back to the seminal contributions of 
Rottenberg (1956), Neale (1964) and Sloane (1971) and has been more recently advocated by 
Szymanski and Smith (1997). 
7. Note that, as suggested by an anonymous referee, we assume away rent seeking on the part of the 
players. The “superstar effect” as defined by Rosen (1981) may provide some players with a higher 
bargaining power at the moment of determining individual wages, and may therefore affect the rent 
dissipation by clubs and/or the estimated wage frontier. A database including observations of several 
European leagues could allow evaluating for instance how the wage frontier of each national industry 
depends on the star player to average player ratio in each country. We leave this concern for future 
research. 
8. “In general, match-attendance models tend to have difficulty in identifying a relationship between 
variables such as admission prices […] and attendances.” (Dobson and Gerrard, 2001, p. 326). 
9. www.ine.es. 
10. A survey of references on this issue can be found in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). All models 
were estimated using the FRONTIER41 software, written by Tim Coelli. 
11. Note that while presenting the results, it will be suggested that µ  is never statistically different 
from 0. The models considering truncated normal distributions will then be discarded and only six sets 
of results will be presented. 
12. We also tested the effect of the lagged GOALt-1 on demand. The results suggested that GOALt-1 had 
a lower and less significant impact on demand than GOALt. Note that football demand in Spain is 
highly sensitive to current performance, as suggested by very frequent instantaneous drops in demand 
for clubs performing badly, even if they have a prestigious historical performance record. Moreover, 
an additional variable, VIC, namely the number of victories obtained during the season, also had a 
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positive effect on demand. However it presented strong evidence of correlation with the number of 
goals scored and has therefore been discarded.  
13. Note however that the effect of SYS is globally insignificant. This is probably due to the fact that 
our aggregate measure shows little variance and partially fails to account for the subtle difference of 
strategies across clubs.  
14. The levels of significance are 5% and 10% (unbalanced and balanced panel respectively). 
15. The fixed-effect specification uses the constant as the reference to evaluate firms’ individual 
effects. 
16. Results on the balanced sample are available upon request. 
17. The budget is just defined as the average wage times the number of players enrolled in the club. 
 
 
Tables 
 
Table 1: Wages and compensation fees 
 
Wages, 1999 
(per week, in Euros) 
Compensation fees  
(up to 2002 in Euros) 
 
1. Del Piero (Italy) 
2. McManaman (Spain) 
3. Kluivert (Spain)  
4. Anelka (Spain) 
5. Vieri (Italy) 
6. Ronaldo (Italy)  
7. Effenberg (Germany) 
8. Balakov (Germany) 
9. Elber (Germany) 
10. Shearer (England) 
11. Owen (England) 
 
114,922 
108,537 
95,769 
92,576 
92,576 
83,000 
79,806 
79,806 
54,269 
46,480 
39,840 
 
1. Zidane (Spain) 
2. Figo (Spain) 
3. Crespo (Italy) 
4. Vieri (Italy) 
5. Mendieta (Italy) 
6. Ferdinand (England) 
7. Overmars (Spain) 
8. Anelka (Spain) 
 
 
 
75,100,000 
61,400,000 
59,760,000 
51,460,000 
48,000,000 
46,800,000 
41,500,000 
39,000,000 
 
 
 
 Source: Dobson and Gerrad (2001) and El País, 28th of August 2002. 
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Table 2: Summary of variables (Statistics of the Unbalanced Panel) 
 
Variable Description Mean Standard Deviation 
    
 
w 
 
Average wage in Euros 
 
875,496 1,465,913 
Y  result measured as the number of points obtained 
over the season 
 
93.5 41.4 
 
K1 
 
Years spent in first league 
 
23.9 25.1 
 
K2 
 
Years spent in second league 
 
17.6 12.4 
UEFA Takes value 1 if the team simultaneously 
competes in the European cup, 0 otherwise 
 
0.178  
CAPS Total number of caps in the national team (all 
players taken together) 
 
87.6 142.6 
D  Demand, effective audience as a year average 
 
17,143 17.154 
SYS Takes value one if the team is organized as 4-3-3 
(four defenders, three midfields and 3 forwards), 
0 otherwise 
 
0.110  
 
SFOR 
 
Share of foreign players in the team 
 
0.254  
SFORW Share of foreign players from outside Europe 
among the foreign players 
 
0.586  
 
GOAL 
 
Number of goals scored over the season 
 
49.5 12.6 
 
SNAT 
 
Share of players enrolled in a national team 
 
0.184  
 
TRAIN 
 
 
Takes value 1 if the trainer is new, 0 otherwise 
 
0.459  
 
VICTO 
 
Number of victories obtained 
 
14.3 4.9 
DIV Takes value 1 if team plays in First league, 0 
otherwise 
 
0.500  
POP Population size of the community the club 
belongs to 
 
523,458 800,464 
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Table 3: Estimation Results: Result and Demand 
 
Parameter Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel 
   
   
 Result  
   
Constant 3.381a 
(0.058) 
3.522a 
(0.072) 
Dˆ  0.434
a
 
(0.021) 
0.391a 
(0.024) 
ρσ  0.304a 
(0.012) 
0.268a 
(0.013) 
   
2R  0.559 0.549 
   
   
 Demand  
   
Constant -2.378a 
(0.5675) 
-2.824a 
(0.682) 
SYS 0.143 
(0.100) 
0.178c 
(0.107) 
SFOR -0.266 
(0.243) 
-0.538c 
(0.285) 
SFORW 0.245b 
(0.105) 
0.560a 
(0.136) 
GOAL 0.738a 
(0.151) 
0.896a 
(0.180) 
SNAT 2.326a 
(0.197) 
2.198a 
(0.214) 
TRAIN 0.002 
(0.061) 
-0.034 
(0.072) 
POP 0.225a 
(0.033) 
0.185a 
(0.038) 
T 0.043a 
(0.016) 
0.061a 
(0.019) 
ξσ  0.508a 
(0.021) 
0.491a 
(0.025) 
   
2R  0.940 0.878 
   
Number of observations 281 196 
Note: The Unbalanced Panel contains 50 clubs of first and second division observed over the  
period 1996-2003. The Balanced Panel includes 28 clubs observed over the same period. 
 Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b), and 10% (c). 
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Table 4: Estimation Results: Average wage 
 
 Unbalanced Panel  Balanced Panel 
Parameters (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Constant 0.105 (0.878) 
0.528 
(0.880) 
2.730a 
(0.456)  
-0.161 
(1.075) 
0.392 
(1.096) 
1.136c 
(0.686) 
Yˆ  
0.564a 
(0.068) 
0.482a 
(0.066) 
0.208a 
(0.032)  
0.625a 
(0.072) 
0.515a 
(0.079) 
0.173a 
(0.034) 
DIV 0.439
a
 
(0.106) 
0.446a 
(0.104) 
0.398a 
(0.099)  
0.306b 
(0.123) 
0.310b 
(0.121) 
0.329a 
(0.116) 
UEFA 0.182
b
 
(0.073) 
0.160b 
(0.072) 
0.149b 
(0.062)  
0.169b 
(0.070) 
0.148b 
(0.070) 
0.141b 
(0.063) 
K1 
0.340a 
(0.031) 
0.344a 
(0.032) 
0.290a 
(0.087)  
0.343a 
(0.038) 
0.347a 
(0.038) 
0.741a 
(0.195) 
K2 
-0.093a 
(0.034) 
-0.094a 
(0.035) 
-0.147b 
(0.073)  
-0.124a 
(0.038) 
-0.122a 
(0.039) 
-0.150b 
(0.075) 
CAPS 0.030 (0.028) 
0.029 
(0.028) 
0.028 
(0.025)  
0.049 
(0.031) 
0.050c 
(0.030) 
0.039 
(0.029) 
t 
0.104a 
(0.010) 
0.083a 
(0.015) 
0.111a 
(0.009)  
0.120a 
(0.011) 
0.098a 
(0.016) 
0.109a 
(0.011) 
2
εσ  
0.278a 
(0.057) 
0.380a 
(0.103) 
0.270*a 
(0.011)  
0.321a 
(0.087) 
0.446a 
(0.149) 
0.271*a 
(0.013) 
η  
- 
-0.061b 
(0.030) -  - 
-0.057c 
(0.030) - 
        
Number of 
observations 281  196 
Note: The Unbalanced Panel contains 50 clubs of first and second division observed over the period 1996-2003. 
The Balanced Panel includes 28 clubs observed over the same period. 
 (1) and (4): Half-Normal distribution, iθ  constant over time but varies across clubs. 
 (2) and (5): Half-Normal distribution, itθ  varies over time and across clubs. 
(3) and (6): Fixed effects technique: No distribution required, iθ  constant over time but varies across clubs. 
 Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 
*
εσ . 
 Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b), and 10% (c). 
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Table 5: Estimation Results: Efficiency exp ( )θ  
 
Unbalanced Panel  Balanced Panel 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
           
Tenerife 3.059 Tenerife 3.135 Tenerife 3.662  Tenerife 3.153 Tenerife 3.189 
Villareal 2.608 Real Madrid 2.779 Real Madrid 3.177  Villareal 2.512 Real Madrid 2.659 
Real Madrid 2.429 Villareal 2.703 Deportivo 2.895  Real Madrid 2.341 Villareal 2.583 
Deportivo 2.070 Barca 2.316 Barca 2.583  Deportivo 2.204 Deportivo 2.325 
Barca 2.050 Deportivo 2.226 Villareal 2.347  Alavés 2.072 Barca 2.227 
Málaga 1.989 Málaga 2.041 Málaga 2.195  Barca 1.996 Alavés 2.110 
Alavés 1.950 Alavés 2.019 Mallorca 2.075  Mallorca 1.920 Mallorca 1.956 
Mallorca 1.842 Mallorca 1.899 Alavés 2.052  Valencia 1.578 Valencia 1.713 
Xeres 1.825 Celta 1.888 Valencia 1.902  Rayo Val. 1.479 Rayo Val. 1.549 
Getafe 1.650 Xeres 1.862 At. Madrid 1.775  Salamanca 1.478 At. Madrid 1.486 
Merida 1.626 Valencia 1.745 Rayo Val. 1.763  Real Socied. 1.377 Salamanca 1.446 
Valencia 1.591 Getafe 1.728 Xeres 1.723  Celta 1.368 Celta 1.418 
Numancia 1.548 Merida 1.577 Getafe 1.699  At. Madrid 1.367 Real Socied. 1.399 
Extremadura 1.530 Numancia 1.565 Celta 1.634  Sporting 1.347 Sporting 1.359 
Salamanca 1.497 At. Madrid 1.547 Extremadura 1.543  Betis 1.299 Betis 1.332 
Lleida 1.450 Recreativo 1.513 Salamanca 1.543  Zaragoza 1.287 Zaragoza 1.323 
Recreativo 1.437 Extremadura 1.505 Lleida 1.537  Las Palmas 1.247 Valladolid 1.286 
Ecija 1.410 Salamanca 1.485 Merida 1.516  Badajoz 1.236 Racing San. 1.275 
At. Madrid 1.400 Rayo Val. 1.452 Real Socied. 1.507  Racing San. 1.230 Las Palmas 1.241 
Real Socied. 1.381 Real Socied. 1.418 Sporting 1.484  Albacete 1.200 Albacete 1.163 
Rayo Val. 1.377 Lleida 1.413 Betis 1.481  Oviedo 1.174 Oviedo 1.163 
Sporting 1.372 Sporting 1.396 Murcia 1.464  Leganés 1.156 Leganés 1.147 
Celta 1.310 Betis 1.346 Levante 1.443  Eibar 1.142 Eibar 1.128 
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Table 5 continued 
 
Betis 1.300 Ecija 1.330 Racing San. 1.376  Valladolid 1.110 At. Bilbao 1.111 
Las Palmas 1.280 Zaragoza 1.328 Numancia 1.338  At. Bilbao 1.104 Espanyol 1.102 
Levante 1.280 Levante 1.321 Leganés 1.307  Sevilla 1.104 Sevilla 1.097 
Zaragoza 1.278 Murcia 1.297 Recreativo 1.288  Espanyol 1.093 Osasuna 1.090 
Badajoz 1.260 Las Palmas 1.285 Las Palmas 1.278  Osasuna 1.093 Badajoz 1.025 
Logrones 1.252 Racing San. 1.276 Logrones 1.265      
Murcia 1.251 Univ. LPalmas 1.261 Oviedo 1.255      
Albacete 1.250 Badajoz 1.259 Badajoz 1.229      
Toledo 1.247 Valladolid 1.247 Toledo 1.219      
Univ. LPalmas 1.245 Racing Fer. 1.235 Compostela 1.214      
Racing San. 1.216 Córdoba 1.227 Ecija 1.191      
Compostela 1.210 Logrones 1.221 Albacete 1.187      
Racing Fer. 1.199 Toledo 1.220 Valladolid 1.166      
Córdoba 1.190 Albacete 1.219 Espanyol 1.143      
Leganés 1.190 Leganés 1.201 Córdoba 1.114      
Hercules 1.180 Compostela 1.189 Hercules 1.106      
Oviedo 1.164 Oviedo 1.170 Eibar 1.080      
Eibar 1.160 Jaen 1.160 Ourense 1.046      
Jaen 1.150 Hercules 1.159 Racing Fer. 1.044      
At. Bilbao 1.130 Eibar 1.157 Sevilla 1.005      
Ourense 1.127 At. Bilbao 1.150 Almería 1.000      
Sevilla 1.112 Espanyol 1.114 At. Bilbao 1.000      
Valladolid 1.105 Sevilla 1.111 Elche 1.000      
Espanyol 1.100 Ourense 1.109 Jaen 1.000      
Osasuna 1.096 Osasuna 1.096 Osasuna 1.000      
Elche 1.080 Elche 1.082 Univ. LP 1.000      
Almería 1.070 Almería 1.063 Zaragoza 1.000      
           
Mean 1.452 Mean  1.525 Mean 1.517  Mean 1.524 Mean 1.569 
Note: (1) and (4): Half-Normal distribution, iθ  constant over time but varies across clubs. 
 (2) and (5): Half-Normal distribution, itθ  varies over time and across clubs. The table presents the mean for each club over the period. 
(3): Fixed effects technique: No distribution required, iθ  constant over time but varies across clubs. 
 
